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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relational configurations for a subsidiary
that belongs to a global industry such as auto components manufacture. As global integration
pressures  are  high  in  this  environment,  there  are  pressures  for  centralization  and  some
subsidiaries  are  losing  resources  and  capabilities  in  benefit  of  headquarters  or  other
subsidiaries  Consequently,  they  may  fight  within  the  MNC  to  maintain  the  control  over
certain resources and capabilities, mainly through strong relationships with local suppliers,
providers, customers or other units of the MNC, that may reach global relevance. While
previous studies have identified the significance of networks as a metaphor to understand
MNC  structure,  we  attempt  to  show  how  the  analysis  of  the  networks  of  contacts  of  a
subsidiary is a useful tool to identify which role is the subsidiary playing in the overall
multinational.  It  shows  useful  to  apply  networks  as  a  tool  that  to  proactively  develop  a
formulated strategy on the side of the subsidiary.
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Introdution
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have been present in academic debate for quite a
long time. An important stream of literature on this topic discusses how global companies
organize  and  manage  worldwide  operations.  Global  strategies  emphasize  how  firms  can
develop competitive advantages by operating in interdependent national markets. Advantages
may come from exploiting differences in national resource endowments, the flexibility of
MNC  networks,  or  economies  of  scale,  scope  and  learning  (Malnight,  1996).
Organizationally, part of the debate has been about how MNCs can be managed by altering
their resource configuration (where they locate key resources) and their organization (how
they  structure  and  manage  worldwide  operations)  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1991,  Nohria  &
Ghoshal, 1997, Porter, 1986, Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
Resource configuration decisions relate to what activities a firm chooses to perform
internally and where it chooses to locate them. Some authors suggest that MNCs need to
develop  distributed  and  specialized  resource  configurations  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1991),
impacting worldwide flows of products, capital, people, and knowledge within the firm. A
common theme in similar discussions has been how to locate resources to pursue sources of
competitive advantage associated with global integration, local responsiveness and learning
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991, Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). In other words, resource configuration
in  MNCs  has  been  traditionally  analyzed  from  an  economic  perspective,  under  the
assumption  that  resource  location  decisions  are  based  on  rational  self-interested
considerations,  such  as  profitability  or  protecting  a  competitive  position.  Following
Granovetter’s 1985) ideas, much of this analysis should include socialized conceptualizations
that  complement  the  important  effects  that  surrounding  social  structures  have  on  the
economic  behavior  of  organizations.  Thus,  it  would  be  interesting  to  extend  alternative
frameworks that relate how resources are configured within a MNC with the interactions
within and across the company’s different local organization sets (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  such  relational  configurations  for  a
subsidiary that manufactures auto components, this being a global market under Bartlett &
Ghoshal’s (1991) specifications. As global integration pressures are high in this environment,
there  are  pressures  for  centralization  and  some  subsidiaries  are  losing  resources  and
capabilities to the benefit of headquarters or other subsidiaries (e.g. a subsidiary in Spain may
lose its marketing resources and capabilities to the benefit of the Italian subsidiary of the
same MNC). These subsidiaries may even end up as mere implementers (1) of a strategy
(1) Bartlett & Ghoshal (1991) classify subsidiaries into four generic roles: Implementer, Contributor, Black
Hole, Strategic Leader. Definitions are extended in later sections.designed by headquarters. Generally, implementers are subject to ever-expanding control by
headquarters, so that their managers have little incentive to improve their managerial skills
and abilities (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987). Consequently, they may fight within the MNC to
retain control over certain resources and capabilities, mainly by building strong relationships
with local suppliers, providers, customers or government agencies –relationships that may
acquire  global  relevance.  Alternatively,  these  subsidiaries  may  turn  themselves  into
contributors by developing specific managerial skills at the subsidiary level. Thus, resource
configurations in MNCs will be the consequence not only of economic decisions, but also of
power and politics. It may be interesting, therefore, to observe the nature of the relationships
of such a subsidiary in order to determine the precise role those relationships play when we
are trying to analyze subsidiary strategy and MNCs’ resource configurations.
Managing Multinational Corporations: From Hierarchies to Networks
Multinational corporations started to appear at the beginning of the 1960s (Chandler,
1962). As globalization and international trade increased, they proliferated and their role in
the  worldwide  economy  became  more  important  (2).  As  Kogut  (1985)  wrote,  the  1980s
witnessed a proliferation of books and papers on the subject of MNCs, trying to provide
answers to questions such as why they existed or what was the best way to organize such
large firms. It is possible to identify two types of theories of the MNC. On one side are those
that equate the MNC to a multi-plant firm with plants in different countries and justify their
existence in terms of transactional advantages. According to this view, MNCs benefit from
internalizing transactions that are performed ineffectively in the market. These explanations
can be labeled as negative theories of the MNC, as they explain the existence of MNCs based
on international market imperfections.
In contrast, certain scholars have voiced the need to build a positive theory of the
MNC (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991, Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). For them, MNCs exist due to
their ability to generate value creation environments through effective coordination of far-
flung units that facilitates the generation and diffusion of innovations throughout all the units
of the firm. These explanations emphasize the geographical-disperse and global-disparate
nature of a type of organization made up of headquarters and different national subsidiaries.
In essence, these frameworks argue that taking advantage of market imperfections is a weak
reason for the existence of MNCs: escalating geographic dispersion not only allows the firm
to benefit by performing transactions more effectively internally than at arm’s-length, but
also can greatly improve coordination, distribution, and management costs (Hitt, Hoskisson,
& Kim, 1997). Multinational corporations’ managers thus have to strike a balance between
the benefits of economies of scale and scope, the opportunity of management learning due to
the  different  contexts  they  operate  in,  and  the  coordination  costs  incurred  to  effectively
manage dispersed units. 
The differences between these two conceptions of the MNC extend to the field of
structure  and  governance.  When  the  success  of  the  MNC  depends  on  its  ability  to  find
transactional advantages, headquarters plays a prominent role in deciding whether or not to
invest and how to coordinate and structure global operations (Porter, 1986). Subsidiaries are
marginally analyzed and are seen as merely implementing strategic imperatives issued by
headquarters. However, when the emphasis is placed on the coordination and structure of the
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(2) By 1996 MNC operations accounted for more than 40% of world trade (UNCTED, 1997). units that make up the MNC in order to improve the firm’s value creation potential through
the diffusion of innovations, the excessive importance given to headquarters is attenuated, as
it is impossible for headquarters to respond effectively to the pressures of global integration
and local responsiveness, these being decisions that are better analyzed at the subsidiary level
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987). We may conclude, then, that managing MNCs is not a matter of
governing a hierarchy but of managing a network of relationships. 
The  evolution  of  the  literature  on  managing  MNCs  was  anticipated  by  Hedlund
(1986),  who  distinguished  between  hierarchical  and  heterarchical  MNCs,  the  latter
resembling  what  are  called  network–based  conceptions  of  the  MNC.  For  example,  a
hierarchical MNC bases it competitive advantage on one center, whether headquarters or
country,  whereas  a  network-based  MNC  relies  on  multiple  centers,  be  they  subsidiaries
or headquarters. By the same token, under a network-based conception of the MNC, some of
the  activities  performed  at  subsidiary  level  (e.g.  R&D,  product  development,  marketing,
sales)  may  be  as  important  as  the  role  played  by  headquarters;  in  contrast,  hierarchical
conceptions of MNCs limit their analysis to how headquarters makes decisions. Finally, a
hierarchical  conception  of  the  MNC  is  usually  symmetric,  that  is  to  say,  it  analyzes
subsidiaries uniformly, even though it is obvious that units operating in South America and
Europe  face  completely  different  environments.  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1987)  named  this
strategy of managing subsidiaries uniformly the UN syndrome. In contrast, network-based
conceptions of MNCs reflect the complexity of these organizations more accurately.
One final reflection is worth mentioning. The literature on MNCs implicitly assumes
the existence of a continuum that defines a MNC based on the particular combination of
pressures  in  the  environment  in  which  the  MNC  operates,  as  regards  integration-
centralization-globalization versus differentiation-local responsiveness-localization. The very
first typologies put forward were based on one or two variables, specially industry structure
(e.g. Caves, 1982, Porter, 1986) or percentage of foreign sales (Stopford & Wells, 1972), and
implicitly assumed a more or less clear relation between strategy and structure. Most recent
contributions highlight the contingent nature of this relationship, arguing that there is no
“best  way”  to  structure  a  MNC  and  that  it  all  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  the
environment in which the dispersed units of the MNC operate. These contingencies are well
summarized in the variables proposed by Prahalad & Doz (1987): global integration and local
responsiveness.
Summarizing,  most  recent  contributions  on  managing  MNCs  claim  that  the
effectiveness of these firms cannot be reduced to a simple, univocal correlation between
strategy  and  structure,  due  to  their  highly  contingent  nature.  Additionally,  analyzing  the
decisions taken at headquarters may leave out the important role played by subsidiaries. In
this sense, it may pay to move the focus of attention to the subsidiaries if we are to better
understand the behavior of MNCs.
Managing MCS’ Subsidiaries: From Dyadic Relationships to Embeddedness
Even though the most extended definitions of a MNC are based on the number of
countries in which a company operates, a more clarifying definition is the one given by
Ghoshal  and  Bartlett.  For  them  “a  multinational  corporation  consists  of  a  group  of
geographically dispersed and goal-disparate organizations that include its headquarters and
the  different  national  subsidiaries”  (1990:  603).  It  is  evident  that  subsidiaries  play  an
important  role  in  the  performance  of  a  MNC,  be  it  in  terms  of  their  ability  to  operate
3internationally or their capacity to develop managerial innovations that add value to global
operations. However, it is surprising that subsidiaries have not been a focus of inquiry until
recently. The first attempts to analyze these units were made in the ’70s and ’80s; themes
such as centralization (Gates & Egelhoff, 1986), formal relationships (Otterbeck, 1981), and
control mechanisms (3) were researched without conclusive statements. This apparent failure
may be explained in part by an incomplete conception of the MNC, because at that time the
MNC was conceived as a hierarchic organization, with headquarters monopolizing strategic
decisions and subsidiaries simply implementing them. Concepts such as the differentiated
network,  developed  and  defended  by  Nohria  &  Ghoshal  (1997),  according  to  which
subsidiaries  are  controlled  by  the  required  complexity  of  their  environment  and  so  are
differentiated even within the same MNC, better define the role played by these units of the
corporation.
The literature on the role of MNC subsidiaries was initiated by Canadian scholars
and their research into centers of excellence (White & Poynter, 1984). They found subsidiary
asymmetry in strategic importance, product development tasks or other operative functions
for  Canadian-based  subsidiaries.  Further  research  extended  this  stream  of  literature  by
applying MNC typologies for subsidiaries, typically suggesting four different roles based on
two variables (see Table 1 for a summary). In general, we can distinguish three viewpoints as
regards subsidiary role. The most common one is to consider the subsidiaries’ role as being
assigned by headquarters. Bartlett & Ghoshal (1987), for example, state that based upon
resources and capabilities and the strategic importance of subsidiaries, headquarters assign
different  roles  to  different  units.  Other  authors  argue  that  it  is  a  subsidiary’s  relative
autonomy that allows it to determine its own strategy (Etemand & Dulude, 1986). Lastly,
other  authors  argue  that  a  subsidiary’s  environment  is  the  determining  factor  and  that
headquarters have to define the organizational structure that best fits the level of complexity
of the environment (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).
Be that as it may, this stream of literature stresses that subsidiaries cannot be treated
uniformly without the risk of grossly underutilizing the company’s worldwide assets and
organizational  capabilities  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1987).  Accepting  that  subsidiaries  can
perform different strategic roles, even within the same MNC, was a great step forward in our
understanding of the management of MNCs. In particular, when this premise was accepted it
became  apparent  that  any  role  performed  by  subsidiaries  cannot  be  separated  from  the
particular endowment of each unit. In this sense, the more different environments a MNCs’
units have to face, the more complex the company’s resource configuration will be, and the
more complicated it will be to organize.
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(3) See Martínez, Jon & Carlos Jarillo (1989) for a comprehensive review.Table 1. Typologies of subsidiaries: Summary
Reference Variables Typologies
White & Poynter (1984) Product scope Miniature replica (adopter)
Market scope Miniature replica (innovator)
Product specialist
Strategic independent
Jarillo & Martínez (1990) Integration Receptive subsidiary
Localization Autonomous subsidiary
Active subsidiary
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1991) Level of local resources  Black Hole
and capabilities Implementer
Strategic importance of  Strategic Leader
local environment Contributor




Birkinshaw & Morrison (1995) Autonomy Local implementers
Integration of activities Specialized contributor
World mandate




Source: Adapted from Paterson & Brock (2002).
As regards MNCs’ resource configuration, the literature has suggested that MNCs
have  to  develop  distributed  and  specialized  resource  configurations  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,
1991). A common theme in similar discussions has been the need to locate resources to
pursue  sources  of  competitive  advantage  associated  with  global  integration,  local
responsiveness and learning (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991, Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). In other
words, resource configuration in MNCs has traditionally been analyzed from an economic
perspective, on the assumption that resource location decisions are based on rational self-
interested considerations such as profitability or protecting a competitive position. Following
Granovetter’s  (1985)  ideas,  Ghoshal  &  Bartlett  (1990)  suggest  that  economic  analysis
typically  ignores  the  important  effects  that  surrounding  social  structures  have  on
organizations’  economic  behavior.  For  these  authors,  certain  MNC  attributes,  such  as
resource configuration and the nature of inter-unit exchange relations that lead to such a
configuration,  can  be  explained  by  the  selected  attributes  of  the  external  network  within
which the organization is embedded and on which it depends for its survival. In other words,
the level of network embeddedness of a subsidiary plays a more important role as regards
resource configuration than the dyadic relationships between the unit and headquarters.
Summarizing, to better understand how subsidiaries contribute to the MNC and how
they intervene in the configuration of the company’s resources and capabilities, it may be
helpful to analyze their external relationships. In this sense, the level of embeddedness of a
particular subsidiary may affect decisions based on economic grounds taken at headquarters,
altering the places where resources are concentrated in order to achieve economies of scale.
This may be particularly critical for subsidiaries that are mere implementers of headquarters
mandates, or contributors, which may be common in global industries (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1987).
5A Subsidiary Perspective
While there have been numerous studies dealing with the network configuration of
the MNC, none to our knowledge has been done at the subsidiary level. We shall focus on
one  particular  kind  of  subsidiary,  the  implementer  (Bartlett  &  Ghoshal,  1991).  This
subsidiary  is  characterized  by  its  presence  in  a  non-important  market,  but  also  by  a
significant  endowment  of  resources.  Even  though  Bartlett  &  Ghoshal  (1991)  categorize
MNCs as global, multinational, transnational and international, they do not make a clear link
between the type of MNC and the specific role subsidiaries can play. This paper attempts to
fill this gap in the literature.
Global industries are characterized by the presence of global customers and global
competitors. At the same time, they are thought to have significant economies of scale in the
development of their value chain activities. However, it is already clear that scale economies
may work differently when we get down to the specifics of each value chain activity (Porter,
1986). While R&D may be global by nature, the minimum efficient scale of a manufacturing
plant does not necessarily need to be global. However, it may be important that these two
activities, R&D and manufacturing, be closely linked through personal contacts that will help
the  R&D  teams  to  develop  new  products  that  are  ready  for  manufacturing.  Similarly,
relations among different activities, all of them with different minimum efficient scales, may
complicate the network of relationships among the different activities within the value chain.
Furthermore,  global  companies  are  never  designed  from  scratch,  but  are  the
consequence of different historical developments that shape the overall configuration of their
international value chain. Thus, some subsidiaries are there because they were acquired in the
globalization process, others might be there because trade restrictions forced their green-field
development at a certain point in time. Rationalizing value chain activities, though possible,
it is not always easy. On the one hand, institutional settings may make it difficult to terminate
certain activities, e.g. the labor cost of a plant closure in Germany or Spain is significant and
may preclude it. On the other hand, certain subsidiaries may have grown specific assets that
make  up  for  the  apparent  inefficiency  of  having  activities  dispersed  among  different
geographical locations.
We conclude that even when we speak of global industries we are not dealing with our
“academic” definition of a global configuration (with most activities concentrated in one region
while sales and marketing take a global approach), but with a number of different subsidiaries
trying to play the global game and being coordinated both through the global headquarters and
through their individual efforts to maintain their status within the global network. We are faced,
therefore, with a global company that, according to our understanding, should have its activities
concentrated  in  a  particular  region  or  subsidiary,  while  in  fact  those  activities  are  globally
dispersed through the different subsidiaries. The subsidiaries face the opposite problem: they
carry out different activities that all belong to a global value chain and so need to coordinate
with  all  the  other  activities  distributed  globally  throughout  the  MNC.  In  network  terms,  a
subsidiary will have a lot of contacts with other subsidiaries, as well as with headquarters. Thus,
we can conclude:
Proposition 1: The egonetwork of a subsidiary whose MNC is global will be dense. In other
words, the subsidiary will present a high architectural openness, not only in
relation to headquarters but also in relation to other units of the MNC such
as line companies, suppliers and customers.
6Subsidiary Types and Subsidiary Network
Global MNCs focus their attention on creating products for a world market and
manufacture  them  on  a  global  scale  in  a  few  highly  efficient  central  plants,  typically
delegating responsibilities for downstream activities to the national units while the center
controls upstream elements. Although Bartlett & Ghoshal (1991) are not specific about this,
national units that belong to a global MNC may perform two generic roles: subsidiaries may
be mere “implementers” of headquarters mandates, or they may be “contributors” to a global
strategy (see also Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995).
Implementers make it possible for a MNC to achieve economies of scale and scope
that  are  critical  for  most  global  strategies.  However,  they  do  not  have  access  to  critical
information and do not control scarce resources. They are “deliverers of the company’s value
added” in Bartlett and Ghoshal words (1991: 100). Their strategic importance lies in the level
of efficiency they achieve, their capacity to maintain the company’s commercial viability, and
their ability to generate resources that support strategic and innovative processes worldwide.
Contributors are  different.  They  try  to  capture  the  benefits  of  certain  local  facilities  or
capabilities and apply them to the broader worldwide operations. They are able to build
excess  resources  in  a  non-critical  environment,  forcing  headquarters  to  redirect  these
resources to global tasks.
Although the typologies are not clear-cut, the subsidiary that is the subject of our
analysis may be classified as an “implementer”. This is not to underestimate the strategic
importance of the unit, but it allows us to catalog its strategic alternatives. If a MNC treats its
subsidiaries  as  implementers,  it  runs  the  risk  of  grossly  underutilizing  the  subsidiaries’
physical  assets  and  organizational  capabilities,  and  demotivating  their  managers.  As  the
globalization  strategy  is  implemented,  subsidiary  managers  may  fight  to  keep  control  of
strategic resources in order to retain global importance. If they want to succeed, they may
also try to generate innovative resources that would have an impact on worldwide processes;
in  other  words,  they  may  try  to  become  “outstanding  implementers”  or  “contributors”.
Therefore,  the  attempts  of  a  subsidiary  that  belongs  to  a  global  MNC  to  gain  strategic
relevance may be synthesized in a movement along the Implementer-Contributor continuum
(see Figure 1).
To develop in this strategic direction, the subsidiary has to decide which are the
critical business activities that are most likely to contribute to the overall global business. The
subsidiary managers will then devote more efforts to these activities, thus increasing their
exposure to international activities. A subsidiary will devote its efforts to contributing to key
business  activities  in  the  overall  global  business.  While  moving  along  the  implementer-
contributor line, a subsidiary will strengthen its relationships with the key activities of the
overall global business. Thus, we can conclude:
Proposition 2: A subsidiary moving from an implementer to a contributor position will have
a dense network of outflow relationships with those activities that are key for
the global business performance.
7Figure 1. Strategic Tendency for Implementers/Contributors
Source: The line is interpreted from Bartlett & Ghoshal's (1991) categorizations.
The subsidiary will increase the performance of these business activities at the local
level, so that the overall business can draw from them. Thus, we can conclude that:
Proposition  3: A subsidiary moving from implementer to contributor will have a dense
network of inflow relationships with key subsidiary activities.
Methodology
As we said in the introduction to this study, our aim is to illustrate these propositions
with a single case study. WEA Brake Systems Spain is a manufacturer of auto components.
One of the authors has had a relationship with this firm for eight years; the internal workings
of  the  firm  and  its  relationships  with  other  operating  companies  were  therefore  deeply
understood. However, in order not to bias the study, we began by deciding what were the key
activities in the firm and comparing our list with the opinion of the firm’s top management.
Next we needed to relate these activities to the networks. To do this, the first task
was  to  determine  the  boundaries  of  the  network  to  be  studied.  We  identified  the  most
important people in the firm on the basis of the key business activities. The researchers
developed one list, and the HR head developed another. These two lists were discussed and
consolidated.  Before  sending  a  network  questionnaire  to  the  people  we  had  selected,  we
talked to each of the plant managers and four of the subsidiary’s top managers to see whether
anyone who should have been on the list had been left out. The resulting list of 55 people
included 32 managers from WEA Spain (58.2% of the sample) and 23 managers from WEA’s











Level of Local Resources and CapabilitiesThe Company
WEA is a diversified group with global market and technology leadership in its
main line of business. It is active in more than 30 countries in Europe, the Americas and Asia
Pacific. The business currently has two major divisions: automotive (4,490 million euros
sales in 2001 and 295 million euros operating profit in the same year), and aerospace (2,357
million euros and 188 million euros). The automotive division is further segmented into four
strategic business units, one of which, the automotive brake systems unit, is the object of this
study.
WEA’s  Brake  Systems  Division  (WBS)  is  a  world  leader  in  the  design  and
manufacture of driveline system products, with 41% by volume of the world market for brake
systems. WBS is WEA’s largest business, with sales in 2001 of 2.8 billion euros. It is a world
leader in the design and manufacture of brake system products. Most of the leading vehicle
manufacturers worldwide (Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs) produce vehicles
containing components made by or under license from WBS. Over 80% of WBS’s sales are
attributable  to  brake  systems.  In  research  centers  in  Germany,  US  and  Japan,  WBS  is
developing new brake systems designed to reduce weight, minimize noise, vibration and
harshness and improve safety. WBS focuses its global engineering resources on pioneering
technological  advances  to  retain  its  world  leadership  position  in  brake  systems  and  to
position itself for OEM outsourcing opportunities.
Auto components has been recognized as one of the few truly global industries. The
number of customers is limited to OEMs, of which there is a limited number worldwide.
Three  main  regions  of  origin  can  be  discussed:  the  US  with  Ford,  General  Motors  and
Chrysler; Europe with a variety of manufacturers (Volkswagen, Fiat, Renault, PSA Group,
D–Benz, Volvo Saab, BMW); and East Asia (Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Daihatsu. Mitsubishi,
Isuzu, Daewoo, Kia and others). The consolidation that has been going on in the automobile
industry has triggered a certain consolidation in the auto components industry (Berger, 2002).
The challenges in the auto components industry are to become more flat and agile, leveraging
global affiliates for responses, while focusing on overall value chain cost-cutting activities.
WBS  has  manufacturing  facilities  in  all  significant  car  manufacturing  countries
worldwide, with the exception of Russia. Its worldwide operations are run through regional
centers in Germany, UK, US and Singapore. WBS operates 46 manufacturing facilities in 20
countries worldwide, with over 20,000 employees. Approximately 44% of sales in 2001 were
originated  in  Continental  Europe,  32%  in  the  Americas  and  8%  in  the  UK.  The  most
important manufacturing facilities in terms of sales are located in the subsidiary company in
Spain, which operates under the name of “WBS Sistemas de Frenos España” (WBS Spain).
WBS Spain has four manufacturing facilities: two of them manufacture brake systems, one
produces tooling for precision forming, and the other manufactures inputs for brake systems.
WBS Spain is the MNC’s most profitable subsidiary (300 million euros sales in
2001, 11% of WBS sales; 1,800 employees). Initially, the subsidiary was able to perform all
the activities of the value chain on its own, with local customers and providers. However, as
the  process  of  globalization  and  the  opening  of  borders  promoted  by  common  European
market policies was implemented, its design centers, product development facilities, and their
customers  and  providers  were  “globalized”,  which  meant  that  certain  resources  were
concentrated geographically in order to obtain economies of scale. The situation as of 2001
shows an increasingly global MNC with a successful subsidiary in Spain losing control over
more and more resources, while keeping control over production facilities and processes.
9WBS Spain distinguishes two processes in the manufacture of its products. The first
is mass production. WBS Spain is responsible for delivering to its customers’ production
facilities,  on  time  and  with  the  highest  possible  quality,  the  required  brake  systems  for
whatever vehicle is in production, regardless of geographic location. The second process is
the launching of new products. This encompasses all the activities that start when an OEM
asks for a particular brake system and finish when the automaker starts mass production.
Accordingly,  WBS  Spain  is  organized  around  these  two  processes.  To  tackle  mass
production,  it  has  a  traditional  function-oriented  structure  centered  on  the  production
facilities.  For  the  second  process,  it  has  project-oriented  teams  that  coordinate  the  entire
process, hiring people from the traditional structure when required. As the global strategy is
implemented,  not  only  resources  but  also  people  and  customers  are  geographically
concentrated, imposing certain limitations on the unit in the way it controls its two main
processes.  WBS  Spain’s  strategy  has  been  explicitly  formulated  as  being  to  become  a
“contributor” to WBS, improving its business processes so that it becomes indispensable to
overall WBS operations.
Results
Table 2 describes the overall egonetwork of WBS Spain at subsidiary level. The 55
respondents to our questionnaire had a total of 734 outside contacts, an average of 13 external
contacts per respondent. To evaluate the total size of the respondents’ egonetworks, we need
to bear in mind that this egonetwork covers only contacts outside the respondents’ own firm
and so probably does not include their closest contacts.
Table 2. WBS Spain’s egonetwork
WBS Line Companies Customers Suppliers TOTAL
WBS Spain # 202 188 191 153 734
(plants included) % 27,5% 25,6% 26,0% 20,8% 100,0%
From the point of view of WBS Spain as a whole, we will proceed hierarchically to
explain its egonetwork. First, we can see that these 734 contacts are distributed more or less
equally  across  the  four  major  categories:  WBS  (27%),  line  companies  (26%),  customers
(26%) and suppliers (21%). Thus, 47% of these key people’s relationships are with outside
actors, namely customers and suppliers, and 53% are with people inside the company. Of the
inside  relationships  50%  are  with  divisional  headquarters  and  50%  with  other  operating
companies. We would argue, then, that these subsidiaries’ relational effort will be distributed
equally among these four types of actors. It is interesting that the importance of the relations
with other line companies supports our first proposition, where we indicated WBS Spain’s
“openness” to other line companies.
Table 3. WBS Spain’s network with line companies
WBS Germany Japan USA Italy UK France
WBS Spain # 209 37 6 35 11 10 82
% 53,6% 9,5% 1,5% 9,0% 2,8% 2,6% 21,0%
10Going one level down, we should try to identify the most important actors among
the line companies. The most important countries in terms of size are Germany, France and
the US. The three of them are of a similar size in terms of revenues and people. The most
important country in terms of relationships with WBS Spain is France. This is consistent with
the fact that France is the country with which there is most operational integration. Both line
companies share the task of serving French customers, producing different parts of the same
product. Accordingly, the need for coordination between the two companies is significant. A
similar explanation can be given for the level of contacts with the US company. WBS Spain
serves components to the US and European plants of one of the big three auto manufacturers.
However, in line with the political rivalry among line companies, the US subsidiary has tried
to keep WBS Spain as far away from the manufacturer as it can. However, the Spanish unit’s
excellent performance has already aroused the US customer’s curiosity, so that there are now
direct relations between them.
Germany is important for a different reason. Even though there is no significant
operational relationship between WBS Spain and the German subsidiary, Germany is the
home  of  WBS’s  automotive  headquarters.  This  means  that  the  relationship  between  the
German operating companies and the division headquarters is closer that would be expected
between a line company and its headquarters, and the line between their roles is sometimes
blurred. Accordingly, WBS Spain, has made a conscious effort to improve its relations with
the  German  operations  through  increasing  contacts  in  division  level  projects.  Moreover,
because of the Spanish unit’s good performance, all the task-forces set up in the context of
divisional improvement programs include a Spaniard, resulting in a significant increase in the
density of the relations between the two subsidiaries.
In general, we find support for our first proposition concerning the overall density of
contacts among line companies in global industries. As we commented in the theoretical part
of the paper, the subsidiary map is not the result of an overall blueprint, but of successive
acquisitions among local firms following the opening of European internal borders. 
Becoming a Contributor
WBS Spain has made a significant effort in this direction. Four business processes
were identified as key to WBS’s business:
1. Developing  new  products.  This  is  basically  done  through  R&D,  mainly  at
headquarters, and is aimed at solving the customers’ need to improve the overall
quality of the cars they produce.
2.  Winning orders from OEMs. This process is handled mainly though the commercial
(marketing  and  sales)  department,  which  gets  access  to  key  individuals  in  the
customer’s organization and finds out about the new cars to be produced and what is
needed. They help WBS Spain to achieve the “shortlist” status that allows it to get
the “request for quotation” needed to put in a bid. Collaboration with the technical
department is then carried on so that a sensible offer is presented and the order is
won.
3.  Launching new applications. Once the order has been won, a process of concurrent
engineering begins (carried out to a greater or lesser extent in the different line
companies)  that  puts  the  product  into  mass  production  after  SOP  (Start  of
11production).  Very  rarely  are  completely  new  developments  required  to  fulfill  an
order; more often what is required are new applications of standard products. Timing
is always an issue here, and different customers respond differently to market or
internal issues. The new applications launch process can last anywhere from a few
months to two or three years, and SOP dates may be changed throughout the project.
4.  Mass production. Once the product runs over SOP, mass production is started and
the project is completely in the hands of the different manufacturing plants. At this
stage  less  interplant  collaboration  is  needed,  as  continuous  improvement  is  now
carried out mainly (though not exclusively) at plant level, seeking the productivity
gains that are written into the contract signed with the OEM in the form of price
reductions.
The first process, new product development is carried out mainly at headquarters.
The main engineering facility, located in Germany, has more than 200 engineers devoted to
new  product  development.  Thus,  it  was  difficult  for  WEA  Spain  to  get  involved  in  it.
However, a specific goal of achieving contributor status was agreed internally. In the years
preceding this study, a significant amount of work was done in this direction and contributor
status was achieved by conducting two research programs within the division. This naturally
led to political problems within the subsidiary and across the division. With contributor status
came power issues. While the division wanted to have hierarchical power over all R&D
activities, WEA Spain, not unjustifiably, had the feeling that local R&D activities were the
result of its own efforts and that it should therefore reap some of the benefits. The loyalties of
the local leader of the R&D effort were divided between two bosses, which caused some
difficulties.
The second process, winning orders from OEMs, was centrally coordinated by the
marketing  and  sales  department.  Each  subsidiary  had  its  own  commercial  director,  but
the subsidiary-level directors were centrally coordinated. When it came to getting fast quotes,
however, the marketing and sales department staff relied on their peers in the subsidiaries,
mainly from the engineering department, whose skill was key to winning the orders. Thus,
the local marketing and sales manager acquired new customers for the division and it was
easier  for  them  to  carry  out  those  projects  in  their  own  manufacturing  facilities  than
otherwise.  With  time,  the  local  marketing  and  sales  managers  disappeared  and  these
relationships changed.
The third process, launching new applications, is paramount to the auto industry.
Concurrent  engineering  and  time-to-market  have  traditionally  been  a  touchstone  of  the
industry.  The  auto  industry  has  been  identified  as  one  of  the  learning  centers  for  other
industries in this respect. The fourth business process, mass production, is the most local.
Given that improvement activities are mostly local, less collaboration is needed with other
operating companies, and more internal relations are needed.
Accordingly, if WBS Spain was to move to contributor status and have a significant
impact on the business, it had to develop relationships with product applications engineering,
the commercial department, and the business units, including commercial and engineering
units, where such existed. 
12Table 4. Becoming a Contributor
Table  4  shows  the  relationships  of  the  different  divisional  departments  and
consolidated plants with the different units of WBS Spain (4). It can be observed that most of
WBS Spain’s relations with divisional headquarters were with the Engineering department
(22%), and that within WBS Spain those relations were concentrated in the central Product
Applications department. Accordingly, 14% of the contacts with other operating companies
were with their Product Application Engineering departments, highlighting the alignment of
the contacts with the strategy pursued.
Significant contacts were also developed with the Commercial department at both
divisional and operating company level. Even though the number of people working in the
Commercial department compared with the Product Applications Engineering department is
on the order of 1 to 5, the number of contacts with these departments at the divisional level
shows a ratio of 1:2 (21/40), and of 1:1 (25/21) at the line company level. Thus, we can
adduce support for our second proposition arguing that the greatest density of relationships
would be found in activities that were critical to the overall business processes.
Table 5 is an elaboration of Table 4. It shows one those cells where the number of
contacts is higher than the average of the cells in which there are contacts. In starting the
network analysis procedure, we should have standardized it with the number of people in
each  department.  However,  in  the  case  of  WBS  Spain,  the  number  of  people  is  also  a
strategic  tool.  The  increasing  investment  in  the  Engineering,  R&D  and  Commercial
departments is something that was done without the complete agreement of the division and
with the aim of working towards the contributor role that they wanted to develop.
Thus, the number of contacts in absolute terms is the result of strategic maneuvering
on the part of WBS Spain. Looking at these two tables, one can argue that the subsidiary
contacts were concentrated in the subsidiary headquarters. This is no arbitrary result. On the
one hand, centralization was occurring at the divisional level, so it would be difficult to have
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AI BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FAB FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MAN CBU LOG
WBS Spain 25 42 02 3 693 71248943 00 0 0 137
Plant 1 00 0 0 0 100 30020100 0 0 07
Plant 2 00 0 1 2 100 30000310 0 0 011
Plant 3 00 0 0 1 210 00000100 0 0 05
Plant 4 00 0 0 1 3001 0000 0101 01 0 0 26
2 54 21 27 13 10 3 23 1 2 6 8 15 5 40 1 0 0 186
1% 3% 2% 11% 15% 7% 5% 2% 12% 1% 1% 3% 4% 8% 3% 22% 1% 0% 0%
AI BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU CBU LOG
WBS Spain 0 33 15 24 12 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 13 13 2 23 2 2 0 143
Plant 1 01 4 0 0 000 30000202 0 0 012
Plant 2 00 5 0 0 000 00002000 0 0 07
Plant 3 0 0001 00 1 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0001 12
Plant 4 00 1 0 0 000 00000300 1 0 16
0 34 2524 22 0 2 3 3 0 0 0 15 18 2 25 3 2 2 180
0% 19% 14% 13% 12% 0% 1% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 8% 10% 1% 14% 2% 1% 1%
WEA Brake Systems (WSB)
LINE COMPANIES (OTHER UNITS OF THE MNC)
(4) See Appendix 1 for abbreviations. these activities distributed in the different plants. On the other hand, given the subtle political
maneuvering that was going on among subsidiaries, directors at WBS Spain wanted to have
the key activities under control, so that they could also maneuver in their own favor.
Table 5. Becoming a Contributor: Significant Relationships
Becoming a Contributor: Who is looking?
Our third proposition has to do with where the outflows are; in other words, which
departments in the subsidiary are looking to establish relationships with other units in the
multinational.  The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  contacts  between  the  different
departments of WBS Spain consolidated among the different plants and the departments at
the divisional headquarters and line companies.
Looking at these two tables, one can see the significant number of relationships
among  the  different  departments.  Consistent  with  previous  explanations,  the  Product
Applications Engineering department (IPA) has the highest number of contacts in both tables,
at a significant distance from the Commercial (COM), Purchasing (COMP) and R&D (I+D
departments).
Looking at the number of relations with divisional headquarters, we can see that
there are 15 cells that have, on average, a higher number of contacts. These are concentrated
in the IPA, IFA (Process Engineering) and Commercial departments. IPA and Commercial
are  consistent  with  previous  explanations  of  the  key  business  processes.  The  Process
Engineering department is highlighted due to the several knowledge-sharing task forces in
the  division  that  were  oriented  towards  sharing  best  practices  across  line  companies  and
where  Spanish  operations  had  a  good  performance  track  record,  although  they  found  it
difficult to sell their ideas to other operating companies. It sometimes occurred, however, that
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A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU CBU LOG
WEA Spain 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 8
Plant 1 0 0 0 0 0
Plant 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plant 3 00 0 0 0
Plant 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
0 001 1 11020 0 0 11 0 2 0 001 0
A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU CBU LOG
WEA Spain 111 1 00 11 0 1 0 0 7
Plant 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plant 2 0 0 0
Plant 3 1 0 01
Plant 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 111 2 0 0000 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 008
WEA AUTOMOTIVE DIVISION (WAD)
LINE COMPANIES (OTHER UNITS OF THE MNC)other  operating  companies  would  go  to  see  WBS  equipment  suppliers  in  the  hope  of
obtaining similar results in operational efficiency, although naturally they did not want to
acknowledge that it was thanks to the Spanish operations that they had first learned about the
efficiency of this particular type of equipment. WEA Spain’s response was to collaborate
with its suppliers to improve the equipment without telling its peers, which otherwise would
have got them into trouble.
Table 6. Becoming a Contributor: Who is looking?
Interestingly enough, when we look at the relations between WBS Spain and other
line companies, we can see that IPA keeps its privileged relational status while Commercial
loses it. This is because joint projects needed IPA collaboration, whereas other commercial
directors from line companies were playing a less developed role at divisional level. It is
worth pointing out the regained role of R&D (I+D) due to its close collaboration with the IPA
department at WEA. This supports our third proposition that the main relations would come
from the departments that were most important for our business processes.
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A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU MANT LOG CBU
CTR 0 0 0 0 0 13 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 10%
CAL 0 0 2 1 0 00 0 1 0 000001 0 0 0 0 5 3%
COM 0 5 0 15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 12%
COMP 0 0 1 0 17 01 0 0 0 001100 0 0 0 021 11%
D G 00 0 0 2 03 0 3 0 000103 0 0 0 012 6%
ENS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 000000 0 0 0 0 2 1%
FABR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 000001 0 0 0 0 2 1 %
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0000 0 0 0 0 2 1 %
IFA 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 5 1 8 1 0 0 0 28 15%
I P A 10 1 5 6 00 1 1 0 00540 17 0 0 0 0 41 22%
I NF 00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0000 4 00 0 00 4 2%
I+D 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 10 0 0 0 0 17 9%
RISK 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 5%
2 5 4 21 27 13 10 3 21 1 2 6 9 15 5 40 1 0 0 0 185 100%
A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU MANT LOG CBU
C T R 00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 000000 0 0 0 0 0 0%
CAL 0 0 10 0 0 00 0 0 0 000000 0 1 0 01 1 6 %
COM 0 0 1 18 2 00 0 0 0 000000 0 0 0 02 11 1 %
COMP 0 0 7 2 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 22 12%
DG 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 000000 0 0 1 0 5 3%
ENS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 001000 0 0 0 0 4 2 %
FABR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000100 0 0 2 0 3 2%
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 %
IFA 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 4 02 0 0 0 012 6%
IPA 0 33 5 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 0 8 0 0 0 2 74 40%
I NF 00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0000 2 00 0 00 21 %
I+D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 13 0 2 0 0 25 14%
R I S K 00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 %
0 34 25 23 22 0 2 3 3 0 0 0 14 18 2 25 0 3 3 2 179 97%
LINE COMPANIES (OTHER UNITS OF THE MNC)Table 7. Becoming a Contributor: Who is looking? Significant relations
Discussion and limitations
Our purpose here has been to illustrate, through in-depth knowledge of a particular
MNC  subsidiary,  that  a  subsidiary’s  network  of  relations  is  a  good  indicator  of  the
subsidiary’s strategy, and that it is also a tool for furthering the subsidiary’s strategy. While
Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (1990)  identified  the  significance  of  networks  as  a  metaphor  for
understanding MNC structure, we have shown how analysis of a subsidiary’s networks of
contacts  is  a  useful  tool  for  identifying  the  precise  role  a  subsidiary  is  playing  in  the
multinational as a whole. Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) analyzed the innovation network of an
entire  multinational  and  showed  how  these  networks  reflect  the  different  roles  that
subsidiaries play in the overall structure. They did not, however, use the network as a tool
that can be used proactively to develop a formulated strategy on the side of the subsidiary.
This study is clearly limited in scope. We have only studied the network of one
subsidiary of which we had intimate knowledge. We have not taken into account the overall
networks  of  other  subsidiaries  with  which  WBS  Spain  collaborated  or  competed  for  a
strategic role in the divisional network. It would have been really interesting to be able to
analyze competing networks and study the relative maneuvering of competing subsidiaries.
However, the complexity of the data involved would make this a major endeavor.
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A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU MANT LOG CBU
CTR 1 0 0 0 1
CAL 0 0 0 0 0
COM 1 1 0 0 2
COMP 0 1 0 0 0 1
DG 0 0 0 0 0 0
ENS 0 0
FABR 0 0 0
HR 00
IFA 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3
IPA 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5
INF 11
I+D 0 0 0 0 1 1
RISK 0 0 0 1 1
0 102 2 1 0 0 10 0 1 1 2 1 30 0 00 1 5
0,29
A BUS CAL COM COMP CTR DG ENS FABR FIN GES HR I+D IFA INF IPA MANU MANT LOG CBU
CTR 0
CAL 1 01
COM 0 1 0 1
COMP 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
DG 0 0 0 0 0 0
ENS 0 0 0
FABR 00 0
HR 0
IFA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 131 2 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 1 0 20 0 00 1 1
LINE COMPANIES (OTHER UNITS OF THE MNC)
WEA Automotive Division (WAD)Even though this study has basically addressed the subsidiary’s external exposure, it
would be equally important to study the consequences of this strategy from the viewpoint of
the subsidiary’s internal organization. While we have devoted all our efforts to looking at the
subsidiary’s external network, it would have been interesting to analyze how these networks
are reflected in day-to-day relations within the subsidiary.
Furthermore, these networks of relations do not occur in a stable world. While WBS
Spain was pursuing this strategy, significant changes were being planned at the organizational
level  within  the  division.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  see  how  these  networks  have
survived  or  succumbed  to  the  centralization  that  was  being  considered  at  the  divisional
level.
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FIGHTING FOR POWER: 
THE STRATEGY OF GLOBAL MNCS’ SUBSIDIARIES
Glossary of Abbreviations












I+D: Research and Development (R&D). 
IFA: Process Engineering
INF: Information Systems
IPA: Product Applications Engineering. 
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